PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

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PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

2002 ANNUAL REPORT

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PACIFIC STATES /BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

Four Pacific Coast states and the Province of British Columbia combined resources in 1989 to form the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. With the addition of Hawaii in 2001, it was renamed the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force.

PREFACE

This Annual Report of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is submitted to the Premier of British Columbia and the Governors of California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska, as well as to the citizens whom they represent. It provides information on the activities and accomplishments of the Task Force and its member agencies from August 2001 through July 2002, which is the period of activity between Task Force Annual Meetings.

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established by a Memorandum of Cooperation signed in 1989, following two West Coast oil spill incidents. The first involved the barge Nestucca, which spilled oil impacting the coasts of Washington and British Columbia in December of 1988. The second incident was the catastrophic spill by the T/V Exxon Valdez in Alaska's Prince William Sound in March of 1989. These events highlighted common concerns shared by West Coast states and the Province of British Columbia related to spill risks from coastal vessel traffic, the need for cooperation across shared borders, and a shared commitment among West Coast citizens of both the US and Canada to protect their unique marine resources.

The Oil Spill Task Force produced a report in October of 1990 that included 46 joint recommendations for spill prevention and response, as well as recommendations specific to each member's jurisdiction. Most of these recommendations have since been incorporated into state or provincial statutes, rules, or programs. They are also reflected in the US Federal Oil Pollution Act passed in 1990 (OPA '90), as well as the Canadian Shipping Act Amendments adopted in 1993.

As state/provincial and federal policies and programs are implemented, the continuing focus of the Task Force is on fostering regulatory compatibility, sharing information and resources, and coordinating regional projects to improve oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response in the shared Pacific waters of the US and Canada. These efforts are guided by our five-year Strategic Plans (1994-1999, 1999-2004) and based on our Mission, Goals, and Objectives as stated on the following page.

When the State of Hawaii authorized its Department of Health, Environmental Health Division, to join the Task Force in 2001, the governing Memorandum of Cooperation was updated and signed by Hawaii Governor Benjamin Cayetano, Alaska Governor Tony Knowles, Washington Governor Gary Locke, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, California Governor Gray Davis, and Gordon Campbell, Premier of British Columbia. The organization's name was changed to the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, and the 1999-2004 Strategic Plan was also modified and reauthorized by the Task Force Members at their 2001 Annual Meeting.

◆

This Annual Report does not reflect oil spill prevention and response activities on the part of any federal agencies or industry organizations except as may have occurred in response to or in cooperation with the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force or a member jurisdiction.

GOALS, MISSION, and OBJECTIVES

OUR MISSION:

The mission of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is to strengthen member agency efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to oil spills in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters by exchanging information, sharing resources, promoting a consistent approach to regulatory standards, collaborating with key stakeholders to address shared concerns, reviewing current legislative authorizations and making recommendations for necessary changes, and advocating for our common interest on national and international issues.

OUR GOALS:

To prevent oil spills in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters, both large spills that occur rarely but cause catastrophic impacts, and small spills that occur daily and have an equally devastating cumulative effect.

To coordinate communication, policy development, response capabilities, prevention and preparedness initiatives, and education in order to maximize efficiency of effort; to learn from one another and share ideas and "products."

To clarify the roles and responsibilities of state and provincial agencies and federal agencies in order to reduce regulatory gaps, overlaps, and conflicts.

To advocate in national and international arenas on selected issues of common concern, earning respect through credibility, clarity of purpose, and collaboration.

To work cooperatively with federal agencies, vessel operators, the oil industry, response contractors, interest groups, and all concerned citizens to create opportunities for political and technological breakthroughs by serving as a catalyst for progressive change.

To educate the public on the impacts of oil spills and issues relating to spill prevention, response, and remediation.

To serve as a model of cooperation and coordination for the rest of North America.

OUR OBJECTIVES

Spill Prevention: Define and implement either regulatory or public/private partnership programs which effectively prevent oil spills and water pollution from vessels, facilities, recreational boating activities, and pipelines.

Spill Preparedness and Response: Enhance response capabilities in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters.

Communications: Improve communications within the Task Force and with the general public as well as with key stakeholders, and maintain a high level of public and stakeholder involvement in Task Force activities.

KEY TASK FORCE PERSONNEL



Task Force Members

Michele Brown, Commissioner (1995-2002)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Tom Fitzsimmons, Director (1996-2002)
Washington Department of Ecology

Harlan Henderson, Administrator (2001-2002)
Office of Spill Prevention and Response,
California Department of Fish and Game

Paul Slyman, Administrator (2001-2002)
Land Quality Division
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Derek Thompson, Deputy Minister (1999-2002)
British Columbia Ministry of Water, Air, and Land Protection

Gary Gill, (2001-2002)
Hawaii Deputy Director for Environmental Health

Coordinating Committee Members:

Larry Dietrick (1999-2002)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Heather Taylor (2001-2002)
British Columbia Ministry of Water, Air, and Land Protection

Stan Norman (1995-2002)
Washington Department of Ecology

Scott Schaefer (2000-2002)
Office of Spill Prevention and Response,
California Department of Fish and Game

Mike Zollitsch (1997-2002)
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Curtis Martin (2001-2002)
Hawaii Hazards Evaluation and Emergency Response Office
of the Environmental Health Administration

Executive Coordinator:

Jean Cameron (1993-2002)
Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force

FROM THE EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR

Dear Reader,

This past year has been one that necessitated changes in our global, national, and local perspectives. The importance of international and interagency coordination has been brought into sharp focus, thus highlighting the value of the Pacific State/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force's efforts to facilitate agency coordination between the US and Canada, among Pacific states, and between state and federal agencies. Although the Task Force's focus remains on our mission to "strengthen member agency efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to oil spills," the missions of our member agencies have been realigned in some cases. Certainly the missions of our federal partners have changed. I noted in my statement to you last year that "we stay vigilant and adaptive." Seldom has a period of time put more emphasis on these qualities than this past year.

In spite of these new demands on our member agencies and the US and Canadian Coast Guards, the stakeholders participating in the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project put their shoulders to the wheel and developed meaningful Findings and Recommendations which will reduce the risk of casualties and drift groundings that might cause oil spills on the West Coast. After the Workgroup adopted draft Findings and Recommendations last Fall, I had the pleasure of working with Rick Holly of OSPR and USCG Commander Bill Uberti, as well as local Workgroup members, to present the draft recommendations in public forums from Alaska to California. It afforded us a remarkable opportunity to meet with people on the West Coast who are working hard on oil spill and marine management issues, including the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council; the Regional Response Teams in Alaska and the Northwest; Harbor Safety Committees for Puget Sound, the Columbia River, San Francisco, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Humboldt Bay, and San Diego; the California Coastal Commission, a California State Lands Commission Customer Service meeting, and the California Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee; the Olympic National Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council; the Western States Petroleum Association Marine Committee and the American Waterways Operators, Pacific Region; and in British Columbia, the Western Marine Community, Pacific Coast Marine Review Panel and the Canadian Maritime Advisory Council. I think we kept the airlines in business after 9/11! Members of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management project workgroup have been recognized by the Task Force for their dedication and commitment to this project.

Also over the last year, the Task Force Coordinating Committee focused on developing a contingency plan prototype for the new decade ahead. This project is unfinished at this time; our task schedule calls for us to develop a

draft which we plan to present at a public roundtable forum in the Winter of 2003. Based upon feedback at that roundtable, we will make necessary revisions and present a final recommended contingency plan model to the Task Force Members at their 2003 Annual Meeting.

We sponsored a very successful roundtable forum this February that focused on Natural Resource Damage Assessment Issues (NRDA). Dr. Roger Helm of the US Fish and Wildlife Service was instrumental in planning and facilitating this roundtable, as were other agency and industry members of the Joint Assessment Team (JAT). The Task Force honored Dr. Helm with a Certificate of Appreciation at the JAT meeting on April 11th.

In addition to these major projects, we continued work on a range of other projects under our Spill Prevention, Spill Preparedness/Response, and Communications objectives. I encourage you to read further and get the full story on all the activities and accomplishments of both the Task Force and our member agencies over the past year. We were gratified that all the West Coast Governors and the new Premier of British Columbia signed the revised Memorandum of Cooperation last year, and we've been equally gratified by the Hawaii Department of Health's dedication to its membership in the Task Force. They have endorsed a number of Task Force Resolutions and Agreements adopted prior to their membership, including the Mutual Aid Agreements.

My personal perspective also changed last year; I now work from a home office on the Oregon Coast. I strain to see Hawaii across the ocean, but more often spot transiting vessels, fishing boats, and the occasional grey whale from my hillside overlooking the often-not-so-Pacific Ocean. While the trip to the airport is longer, it's invigorating to be reminded daily of what it is we're all working to protect: this amazing marine wilderness area and its estuaries and rivers.

I hope to see you at our Annual Meeting in the summer, our winter Roundtable, or the 2003 International Oil Spill Conference in Vancouver, BC next April. Until then, stay vigilant, adaptive, and dedicated!

Sincerely,

Jean R. Cameron

Jean R. Cameron
Executive Coordinator

2001-2002 IN REVIEW:

Oil Spill Task Force Activities and Accomplishments

■ *SPILL PREVENTION PROJECTS:*

THE WEST COAST OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT

When Task Force Members signed a resolution on vessel routing in 1996, they emphasized their concerns regarding oil spill risks associated with groundings and collisions from vessel traffic off the West Coast. In response to these concerns, the Task Force has co-sponsored the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management (WCOVTRM) project.

The WCOVTRM Project Workgroup includes representatives from our member agencies as well as key US and Canadian federal agencies, environmental and citizen groups, oil and shipping industry organizations, and ports. A total of 41 members and alternates have worked on this project since 1999, with the intention of producing traffic management recommendations that will improve the margin of safety for our sensitive coastal resources. The Workgroup has been co-chaired by Rick Holly of the California Office of Spill Prevention since it was formed in 1999. US Coast Guard Pacific Area co-chairs have included CAPT Ed Page, CAPT Frank Whipple, CDR William Uberti, and CAPT Glenn Anderson. Over the 2001-2002 work-year, the Project Workgroup met in San Diego, California and Vancouver, BC in addition to several conference calls and a steady flow of emails.

At their first meeting in 1999 the WCOVTRM Workgroup agreed to the following project goal statement: *To develop an offshore vessel traffic scheme for the West Coast that will prevent environmental damage.* The Workgroup agreed that the geographic range of the project would be from Cook Inlet to San Diego. This area of focus is offshore only and will "connect" with Traffic Separation schemes, but will not directly address them, since that work is being done in more local forums. In addition, vessel traffic management issues for the Inside Passage of British Columbia and Alaska are not within the purview of this project.

The Workgroup agreed to address grounding risks from tank ships and tank barges, as well as passenger, fishing, and dry cargo vessels 300 gross tons and larger. Over the 1999-2000 period, the Workgroup collected data on West Coast traffic patterns in the area of concern, traffic volume, existing vessel traffic management measures, weather and ship drift patterns, historical casualties, assist vessel availability, and the likely environmental, economic, and social consequences of an oil spill. The

results of this data collection effort are covered in detail in our 2001 Annual Report and in the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Report available on the Task Force web site at http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm

From 2000 to 2001, the WCOVTRM project workgroup developed a Relative Ranking/Risk Indexing Worksheet that addressed the data outlined above. Using the worksheet, jurisdictional subcommittees scored a total of 52 probable or actual casualty scenarios for Alaska, British Columbia, Washington/Oregon, and California. These were then extrapolated to location intervals ranging from 12 nautical miles (nm) to 100 nm offshore, thus creating maps of higher and average risk zones coast-wide.

The WCOVTRM project workgroup also developed a model for estimating the probable response time of rescue tugs from seven West Coast ports with substantial populations of tugs capable of operating under severe weather conditions. Vessel drift rates under both average and worst-case weather conditions were used. These models defined coastwise contours for both weather conditions, east of which a tug was not likely to reach a drifting vessel before it grounded. Together, these two risk models helped the Workgroup define the geographic areas of relatively higher risk on the West Coast.

Altogether, nine risk factors were used in these two models:

1. Volume of oil/ vessel design
2. Drift rate
3. Higher collision hazards
4. Distance offshore
5. Weather/Season
6. Tug availability
7. Coastal traffic density
8. Historic casualty rate by vessel type
9. Environmental sensitivity of coastal areas

The WCOVTRM Project Workgroup felt that the risk for four of these factors might be reduced, so they established subcommittees to develop risk reduction recommendations addressing the higher collision hazard factor, the historic casualty factor, the tug availability factor, and the distance offshore factor. The Workgroup and Subcommittees used the following criteria in developing their recommendations:

- It is supported by the data in the study.
- It is realistic, meaning capable of being implemented with available technology and expertise within a reasonable timeframe.

- It would be effective, meaning providing real protection to the environment, not just the appearance of protection.
- It would be economically feasible, meaning capable of being implemented without imposing unreasonable cost increase on vessel owner/operators, their customers, or ports.
- It would be flflexible, meaning allowing for improvements and changes in technology and policies.

After developing draft Findings and Recommendations in the Fall of 2001, Rick Holly, CDR Uberti, the Workgroup members, and Jean Cameron gave presentations on the Project and draft recommendations to the following groups:

- 12/6/01: ALASKA Regional Response Team
- 12/7/01: Cook Inlet Regional Citizens' Advisory Council Board of Directors
- 12/11/01: US Coast Guard Navigation Safety Advisory Council
- 1/9/02: Columbia River Ports and Waterways Safety Committee Meeting
- 1/18/02: Olympic National Marine Sanctuary Advisory Council
- 1/23/02: San Diego Harbor Safety Committee
- 1/31/02: NW Regional Response Team and Area Committee
- 2/5/02: California Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee
- 2/6/02: LA Harbor Safety Committee, Los Angeles
- 2/7/02: Western States Petroleum Association Marine Committee
- 2/13/02: Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee
- 2/14/02: San Francisco Harbor Safety Committee, Oakland, CA
- 2/27/02: Western Marine Community, Pacific Coast Marine Review Panel, Vancouver, British Columbia
- 3/6/02: California Coastal Commission
- 3/19/02: Canadian Maritime Advisory Council
- 3/20/02: California State Lands Commission Customer Service Meeting
- May, 2002: Humboldt Bay Harbor Safety Committee
- Draft Findings and Recommendations were also available on the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force web site during the outreach period

Public comment on the draft Findings and Recommendations was received until March 31st, and was reviewed and discussed by the WCOVTRM Project Workgroup at their April 2002 meeting, prior to adoption of their final Findings and Recommendations. Here are the Findings and Recommendations of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup:

I. Findings and Recommendations regarding Collision Hazards on the West Coast

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that the risk of vessel collisions increases with traffic density. One area of increased traffic density is at port entrances. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup therefore recommends that Harbor Safety Committees or their equivalents in West Coast ports continuously monitor this risk and evaluate the need for enhanced traffic safety systems at their port entrances.

2. Based on their survey of coastal transits for July of 1998 through June of 1999, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that coastwise traffic density is relatively higher along the section of the West Coast between the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Los Angeles/Long Beach than either north of the Strait or south of LA/LB. The coastal sections of highest density within this area are those between the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Columbia River, and between San Francisco and Los Angeles/Long Beach.

   While we recognize that the transit numbers for that period represent only one snapshot in time, according to our best professional judgment we foresee no major changes to that relative volume pattern. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup anticipates that the pending AIS carriage requirement, when fully implemented, could significantly reduce any collision hazard in these areas of relatively higher traffic density. We therefore recommend that the maritime and towing industry operating on the West Coast consider implementing compatible Automatic Identification System (AIS) carriage in advance of the required schedule.

   Because the Workgroup feels that AIS carriage will be adequate, we find that the risk of collisions associated with these traffic densities does not justify a recommendation for a traffic control scheme covering the entire West Coast. This finding is not intended to preempt local decisions to monitor compliance with traffic separation schemes or Areas To Be Avoided or future decisions to use AIS data to track vessel traffic patterns.

3. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Workgroup finds that different offshore ballast water exchange



standards have been adopted by California, Oregon, Washington, and various Canadian west coast ports (under the auspices of the Transport Canada publication "Guidelines For The Control Of Ballast Water Discharge From Ships In Waters Under Canadian Jurisdiction"). Although the Project Workgroup does not find that these differing standards impose an increased risk of collision offshore, we recommend that the US Coast Guard, in consultation with Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Transport Canada, and consistent with IMO actions, adopt a single set of preemptive national or regional offshore ballast water exchange standards that would enhance the consistency of navigation for the purpose of ballast water exchange on the West Coast.

II. Findings and Recommendations regarding Historic Casualty Factors

Vessel casualty data collected for this study indicate that there were over 800 reported marine casualties involving vessels 300 gross tons or larger along the West Coast of North America from 1992 to 1999. Pro-rated for a one year period, which is the length of time for which we collected transit data, this number represents approximately 0.52% of all vessel arrivals on the West Coast. It is worth noting that, since foreign flag vessels are not required to report casualties which take place outside of the 12 nm territorial sea, the total number of reported casualties within our study area may have been less than the actual number that occurred. Ninety-six of these casualties fall within the scope of this report as "offshore" (3-200 nm) casualties which had the potential to cause a significant oil spill. Pro-rated for a one-year period, this represented 0.062% of all vessel arrivals on the West Coast. These casualties ranged from mechanical failures to collisions or groundings -- basically, any incident that may have caused an oil spill of 1000 gallons or more. Overall, the Workgroup found that incidents involving mechanical and equipment failures do occur off the West Coast with enough regularity - an average of 12 times/year over the study period - to justify our concern that such incidents could result in drift groundings and the release of oil or other hazardous materials into the environment.

1. The Workgroup finds that a heavy concentration of reported casualty positions near major ports can be discerned as one trend. This may be attributed to higher traffic density in these areas, as well as to the fact that ships conduct their status review of steering and propulsion systems 12 hours prior to entering US waters. Therefore the incidents are reported and monitored closely (loss of steering was the most common type of equipment failure). The

USCG Marine Safety Office Puget Sound has worked with the Puget Sound Steamship Operators Association to develop a recommended "Standard of Care" covering maintenance procedures, preventive measures, and actions in the event of a power loss. The Workgroup recommends adoption of a similar Standard of Care by other West Coast US ports and encourages Canadian authorities and industry to examine the applicability in Western Canadian waters as well.

2. The Workgroup also finds that cracks and fractures in tank vessel cargo tanks were the most common type of structural failure identified in the casualty data. Structural stress for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) trade tankers is not unusual, considering that these tankers routinely transit through the harsh environment of the Gulf of Alaska. Moreover, TAPS tankers are subject to very stringent inspection and reporting standards, which may skew the reported vessel casualties to include a high number of tanker incidents. The Workgroup anticipates that such incident frequency will decrease as new double-hull replacements come on line for the existing TAPS fleet. The Workgroup recommends continued vigilant application of the Critical Area Inspection Program (CAIP) by the US Coast Guard as the TAPS fleet ages, and encourages TAPS tanker operators to consider expedited replacement schedules.

3. The Workgroup also found that cargo/freight ships had the highest number of casualties overall, but notes that this vessel type also represents the greatest number of offshore transits. The resultant overall rate of casualties per transits of 0.054% for cargo/freight ships represents a low average casualty risk. We note that these vessels are subject to national and international safety and environmental regulations, as well as to our recommendations on AIS carriage and on maintaining a voluntary recommended minimum distance offshore.

4. Fishing vessels also ranked high in the mechanical/equipment failure category; their overall rate of casualties per transits was 0.384%. Based upon the Workgroup's examination of existing and proposed programs sponsored by both government and the fishing industry to improve safety overall, the Workgroup recommends implementation of the US Coast Guard's Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Action Plan.[1] The Workgroup also recognizes the State of

1 See copies of Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council, April – June 2001, pages 61-62 at http: //www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/proceed/q2-01.pdf. The eight long-term action items identified in the plan include completing a regulatory project on stability and watertight integrity for certain fishing vessels; improving casualty investigation and analysis; mandatory vessel examinations; and mandatory training-based certificate programs for operators and crew.



Washington's Fishing Vessel Inspection program as a good model for fishing vessel inspections, since it focuses on reducing accidents caused by human error.[2]

5. The Workgroup looked into casualty rate reductions to be expected as a result of implementation of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), which is being phased in through July of 2002, as well as the 1995 Amendments to the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) which are being phased in through August of 2002 internationally and February of 2003 for US domestic vessels. The Workgroup finds that any risk reduction trends attributable to these measures should be discernable after full implementation.

III. Findings and Recommendations regarding Rescue Tug Availability on the West Coast

1. Based on a 2000-2001 inventory, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup found that approximately 182 ocean-going tugs operate out of West Coast "home ports." Of these, 77 were found to be capable of severe weather rescues based upon our analysis of existing studies on the bollard pull necessary to operate in such conditions. The Project Workgroup further finds that the capability of potential rescue vessels on the West Coast has improved greatly in recent years with the construction and placement of numerous state-of-the-art tugs with greater horsepower, maneuverability and high technology equipment.

2. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup conducted an analysis of the probable response times of these rescue tugs from their home ports under both average and worst case wind conditions, assuming that a disabled vessel is drifting towards shore and no other means is available to stop its drift. This analysis defined response time contours which varied from 15 to 216 nautical miles offshore, depending upon various model variables. This information was used in the Relative Ranking/Risk Indexing model to define higher risk areas on the West Coast.

2 Washington's inspection standards for fishing vessels can be found at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/prevention/Fishing%20Vessel%20Accepted%20Industry%20Standards.pdf

3. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Workgroup finds that the International Tug of Opportunity System (ITOS), which operates in the US/Canadian transboundary waters of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound, and which covers the coastline of British Columbia as well, provides information on the location and basic capabilities of ocean-going tugs. This information supplements tug location information available through the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) system for that area.

4. The Workgroup finds that it would be beneficial to enhance tug location and capability information coastwise. The Workgroup recognizes that International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated AIS carriage, as well as US domestic requirements for AIS carriage, should be in place for tugs no later than 2007, or 2004 as currently proposed by the US. The Workgroup therefore recommends that the US Coast Guard evaluate whether the information to be available through AIS carriage will provide equivalent or better tug location and capability information than that provided by ITOS. If so, the US Coast Guard should take steps to ensure that this information on possible rescue tug locations is made available to all Captains of the Port on the West Coast. If not, or if the carriage requirements are not implemented by 2007 at the latest – optimally by 2004 – we recommend that the US Coast Guard consider placing transponders on ocean-going tugs not already carrying them, and adding signal receiving stations as needed to establish a coastwise network for information on ocean-going tug locations.

5. Where the tug availability risk factor is high due to a lack of readily available severe weather rescue tugs as identified by our tug homeport analysis, the Workgroup recommends several measures or combinations of measures for consideration by local jurisdictions to reduce that risk, including investment in a dedicated rescue tug, creation of a stand-by tug fund, or adoption of regulations requiring rescue tug contracts held by vessel operators.

   We find that dedicated rescue tugs are expensive investments[3] and that funding schemes vary from federal funding in the UK, France, and South Africa to private funding for a tug stationed at Cape Hinchinbrook, Alaska, to state funding for a tug stationed at Neah Bay, Washington during the winter months[4].

3 $2,555,000 annual operating costs were estimated (based on $7,000/day for the tug at Neah Bay), which is only on station for a six month period.

4 The State of Washington has recommended that the federal government share funding of the tug.

Regarding a regulatory approach, we find that the US Coast Guard is developing salvage contract requirements as part of the oil spill contingency plans covering tank vessels; their final rule is not expected to be completed until 2004. The State of California has salvage and rescue tug contract requirements that applied to tank vessel contingency plans effective 7/1/2000, and similar regulations that will apply to non-tank vessel contingency plans effective July 1, 2002.

Another possible measure is a stand-by fund. In the US, such a fund could be supported by both state and federal appropriations that provide funding for a Captain of the Port decision to require an assist tug(s) when circumstances warrant such a preventive measure. In Canada, authority exists to require a rescue tug to stand-by a vessel if the threat of pollution is imminent; the resulting cost is then the subject of legal interpretation. Canadian authorities could consider use of a stand-by fund to cover the cost of such cases.

IV. Findings and Recommendations regarding the Distance Offshore Risk Factor

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that the risk of a grounding/collision generally increases the closer a vessel transits to shore. Using a relative ranking/risk-indexing model that incorporated nine risk factors (volume of oil/vessel design factor, drift factor, higher collision factor, distance offshore factor, weather/seasonal factor, tug availability factor, coastal route/density factor, historical casualty factor, and environmental sensitivity factor), the Workgroup mapped areas of higher risk along the West Coast of Canada and the United States. The resulting higher risk area line was generally 25 miles from land along the entire West Coast, except at one point off Southeast Alaska where it extended to 50 nm, off Northwest BC, where the area extended to 100 nm offshore, and off Point Arguello in California, where it extended to 50 nm offshore. The workgroup finds that vessels transiting within these higher risk areas have a greater potential for a grounding due to one or more of the risk criteria than if they transited offshore of these areas.

2. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup recommends that, where no other management measure such as Areas to Be Avoided (ATBAs), Traffic Separation Schemes (TSSs), or recommended tracks already exist, vessels 300

gross tons or larger transiting coastwise anywhere between Cook Inlet and San Diego should voluntarily stay a minimum distance of 25 nautical miles (nm) offshore.

3. For the sake of consistency with existing agreements, the Workgroup further recommends that, where no other management measures such as ATBAs, TSSs, Tanker Exclusion Zones, or recommended tracks already exist, tank ships laden with crude oil or persistent petroleum products and transiting coastwise anywhere between Cook Inlet and San Diego should voluntarily stay a minimum distance of 50 nm offshore.

4. Vessels transiting short distances between adjacent ports should seek routing guidance as needed from the local Captain of the Port or VTS authority for that area.

5. In addition, the Workgroup recognizes that laden tank barges operated by members of the American Waterways Operators have agreed to a voluntary policy of transiting at least 25 miles offshore of the US West Coast. The Council of Marine Carriers in British Columbia has committed to a similar voluntary policy for its laden tank barges transiting in the open ocean off the West Coast of Canada, but also maintains the longstanding practice of tugs seeking refuge in the many inlets available along the BC coastline which may be the safer action under certain circumstances.

6. Nothing in these voluntary minimum distance offshore recommendations is intended to preclude a vessel master from taking prudent action for the safety of the vessel and its crew.

7. The Workgroup further recommends that these voluntary minimum distances offshore be communicated to mariners by placing the text of these recommendations in the Coast Pilot and Sailing Directions for the West Coast, and also by placing notes on the appropriate nautical charts, to be repeated at headlands, which indicate the voluntary minimum distances offshore and refer the mariner to the Coast Pilot and Sailing Directions for further details.

8. Regarding the areas where the Higher Risk zones go beyond 25 nm, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Workgroup finds that various factors mitigate the risk in these areas. For instance, the coastal transportation trade along British Columbia and SE Alaska is primarily by tug and tows. A number of powerful potential "rescue tugs" are frequently transiting through these areas as a result of this unique trading pattern. These transiting tugs



supplement the rescue tugs located in homeports as used in this study. In addition, many of these coastal trading tugs are powerful long distance tugs that report in to Canada's MCTS (VTS) and/or are equipped with transponders that enhance their identification as possible rescue tugs. For the area off Point Arguello, the Workgroup finds that the northbound lanes of the Traffic Separation Scheme to/from Los Angeles/Long Beach will capture this traffic.

V. Findings and Recommendations regarding Data Improvements

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that due to the configuration of the databases currently in use by US and Canadian federal agencies, information on cause and outcome of casualties is difficult to extract. We note that the US Coast Guard and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board are revising their vessel casualty databases, and recommend that they redesign these systems to allow for improved access to information on both the causes and outcomes of reported incidents. The Workgroup further recommends that the member agencies of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force implement their agreement to include causal information in their oil spill incident databases and to share that information on a coastwise basis.

2. The Workgroup also recommends that the US and Canadian Coast Guards work with the West Coast states and maritime industry to investigate the causes of past vessel incidents and casualties on the West Coast over a period of not less than five years. Particular focus should be given to casualties that might have led to a grounding (including propulsion losses, steering failures, tow wire failures, and navigational errors), collisions, and allisions. A final report should provide summary information on causes, trends, and possible prevention mechanisms.

3. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup recommends that the US and Canadian Coast Guards continue to coordinate with marine exchanges and other appropriate organizations to improve coast-wise data collection procedures covering vessel movements in order to provide more detailed and standardized information regarding vessel types, cargo, routing, and ports of origin. Future implementation of AIS carriage should be evaluated as a potential source of data for this purpose.

VI. Recommendation regarding Implementation Review

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup recommends that the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force work with the US and Canadian Coast Guards in 2007 to review the status of implementation and efficacy of the final recommendations from this project.

THE SPILL INCIDENT AND CAUSAL DATABASE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Realizing that member agencies were running into compatibility problems between their own databases and the reporting program developed for the Task Force, the project emphasis for the 2001-2002 work year has been on addressing that problem. Each member agency has been working to integrate the approved data dictionary into their databases. Task Force members are also working together to plan an incident investigator training event this fall, to which representatives from other state and federal agencies have been invited.

THE PACIFIC OIL SPILL PREVENTION EDUCATION TEAM

The Task Force Executive Coordinator participates in the Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET), as do representatives from the Washington Department of Ecology and the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality. Other POSPET members represent King County Hazardous Waste, Oregon State University Extension Sea Grant, Washington Sea Grant, the California Coastal Commission, the Oregon State Marine Board, the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, and the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission. POSPET provides a forum where these programs can coordinate outreach to recreational boaters and marina with a focus on preventing small oil spills that add up to big environmental problems.

MONITORING TAPS TANKERS

Laura Stratton of the Washington Department of Ecology provides the Task Force agencies with quarterly information on the status of Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) tankers which transit the West Coast. These reports cover owner/operator, date of build or scheduled date of build, hull configuration, deadweight tonnage, conversion date if single hull or double bottom, and retirement date. This information is also posted on the Ecology web site, which is listed on page 45. The Task Force member agencies are also committed to sharing information among themselves regarding casualties and incidents involving both tank and non-tank vessels that are transiting between member jurisdictions.

SPILL PREVENTION TOPICS OF CONCERN

Each year the Coordinating Committee monitors and shares information on selected spill prevention topics. Our topics for 2001-2002 included:

- Cruise ship operations with regard to spills and other water pollution impacts
- Oil spill prevention research and development
- Pipeline spill prevention
- Availability of the US federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for spill prevention
- Bunkering and Oil Transfer Standards; and
- Offshore Lightering

■ *SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PROJECTS:*

A REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

Beginning at their Fall 2001 meeting, the Coordinating Committee undertook a multi-year review of the vessel and facility oil spill contingency planning requirements of member agencies. Their goal is to develop common objectives that will enhance spill preparedness and promote coastal regulatory consistency. The specific requirements under reviewed include the following topics:

- Qualified Individuals
- Incident Management Teams
- Oil Spill Response Organizations
- Geographic Response plans/strategies and other shoreline protection mechanisms
- Response standards that promote a systems approach
- Non-mechanical Response Strategies
- Responder training standards
- Drills/exercises
- Planning cycles
- Salvage, emergency services, and source control
- Wildlife rescue and rehabilitation
- Incident management beyond 24 hours
- Scenario assumptions
- Financial responsibility requirements

The Committee hopes to develop a prototype contingency plan to present for public input at a roundtable event during the winter of 2002-2003, then present a final set of recommendations to the Task Force members at their 2003 Annual Meeting.

THE INTEGRATED VESSEL RESPONSE PLAN GUIDELINES

In 1998 the Task Force completed a cooperative project with the US Coast Guard and industry stakeholders that resulted in approval of a voluntary Integrated Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) format. This format allows correlation of West Coast state planning requirements as well as the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by the Canadian Coast Guard with the US Coast Guard vessel planning requirements.

The Task Force Members signed a formal agreement in 1998 reflecting their willingness to accept vessel response plans submitted in the IVRP format. They also agreed to communicate any new or revised contingency planning regulations to the Task Force Executive Coordinator for updates to the format guidance matrix. In addition, the Canadian Ministry of Transport determined that the Integrated Vessel Response Plan format will be acceptable to meet their vessel planning standards, since it includes the SOPEP format from Marpol. A formal endorsement from the US Coast Guard is also in place.

The integrated format guidance matrix is available to planholders on the Task Force website, and is kept current with any changes in member agency contingency planning regulations.

A ROUNDTABLE ON NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ISSUES

"How NRDA Really Works: Industry and Trustee Perspectives" was the title of a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) roundtable discussion sponsored by Task Force on February 7, 2002 in Concord, California. Dr. Roger Helm, Chief, NRDA & Spill Response, USFW Region 1, served as the Roundtable Moderator. Ms. Linda Burlington, Senior Counselor for Damage Assessment, NOAA, was the Keynote speaker. Forty-nine persons participated, representing agencies, industry, attorneys, response organizations, wildlife recovery organizations, consultants, the National Pollution Fund Center, and the International P&I clubs.

The first of two Trustee/Industry panels addressed the phases of Injury Assessment and Damage Determination. Panelists were asked to address such topics as cooperative assessments, how to deal with data uncertainty, and what data is most essential to gather during this phase. Steve Hampton of OSPR and Tony Palagyi of Equilon were asked to recommend types and quantity of data to collect, and to discuss the role of NRDA vis-à-vis response and the need for baseline data plans. David Chapman of NOAA and Gordon Robilliard of Entrix also addressed the strengths and

weaknesses of Habitat Equivalency Analysis/Resource Equivalency Analysis for determining damages.

The second industry/trustee panel focused on the Settlement and Restoration phases of NRDA. Besides addressing the roles of consultants and attorneys during these phases, Kathy Verrue-Slater of OSPR and Gene Mancini of ER Mancini & Associates also discussed equitable settlements and restoration implementation. Dan Welsh of the USFW Service and Mike Ammann representing Chevron /Texaco were asked to what extent industry should be involved in restoration planning, implementation, and monitoring. They also addressed the value and utility of regional restoration plans and compensation tables. In addition to these topics, speakers and Roundtable participants also addressed NRDA differences under the OPA 90 and CERCLA regulations.

Some of the Trustee needs and issues identified during the Roundtable were:

- A focus on faster restoration and less litigation;
- A framework for cooperative planning and consensus decision-making;
- Provisions for data sharing;
- Public participation (since the public helps to define the issues); and
- Improved funding, especially for state trustees who often lack adequate funding to participate fully in the NRDA process.
- It was noted that most local governments are not trustees, so it's usually the responsibility of state trustees to liaison with local governments and represent their concerns.
- One Trustee representative sought increasing industry involvement when the Responsible Party (RP) has engineers or other staff able to design restoration projects, or when the RP owns the land where the restoration will be done, or if the RP owns equipment necessary for the restoration project.

Industry needs and issues that came up during the discussion included:

- Whether a company could get NRDA credit for mitigation banking prior to a spill event, such as creating a wetland area. Ms. Burlington noted that it would be best if it were approved as part of a regional plan. Overall, it's a good thing to do for the environment, but it's hard to fit it into a liability scheme like NRDA, since the improvement would be considered baseline if it exists prior to the event.
- Regarding RP efforts at early restoration during spill response, there's the question of how much credit the RPs will get for such

actions. It is often a leap of faith on the part of the RP as to how much credit they will ultimately get, but we often find them offering to do early restoration. It makes a lot of sense, since such actions may very well minimize the injury, and it gets restoration started sooner.

- Regarding who should implement restoration, it may be in the RP's business interests to conduct the restoration because RPs generally can do the work faster and at less cost than trustees, and can promote a partnership attitude between the RP and the trustees. One industry panelist noted that he would want specific performance criteria to be developed in order to clarify expectations, however, and noted that the RP may not want to be involved if they don't own the impacted property. The P&I clubs representative stated that they would be interested in implementing restoration if there were a financial benefit and more control over project conclusion.

Ms. Burlington noted that NOAA had recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Group of P&I clubs - which cover 98% of the worlds vessel tonnage - to facilitate coordination before, during, and after spill events in the USA. A representative of the international P&I clubs who attended the Roundtable stated that they are interested in developing MOUs with other US trustees as well.

Proceedings from the NRDA Roundtable are available on the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force web site (see address on page 33 below).

1-800-OILS-911

The Task Force maintains this toll-free spill reporting number in California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia. Although it is available for anyone to use, information regarding the number is targeted at recreational boaters and fishermen through the same outreach used by POSPET (see page 17 above). The number automatically reaches the 24-hour emergency reporting number in each of these four jurisdictions as a function of the location from which the call originates. For example, a call made to 1-800-OILS-911 from anywhere in Washington will automatically reach the Washington emergency reporting number. Usage analysis for August 2001 through April of 2002 shows that the OILS-911 number has been used 116 times over that period. The breakdown shows that 23 of those calls were made in British Columbia, 12 in Washington, 9 in Oregon, and 72 in California.

OIL SPILL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerned that their agency oil spill R&D budgets have been diminished over the years, the Task Force's Coordinating Committee collaborated on a set of Oil Spill Research and Development Recommendations. These cover new or continuing research into:

- Pipeline repair
- Dispersant use
- Tundra treatment techniques
- Management of oily wastes in remote locations
- In-situ burning of oil spills in broken ice conditions
- Pumping, transfer, and storage of viscous crude oil and heavy fuels
- Sonic bird hazing techniques
- Mapping of marine resources at risk
- Automated wildlife search and collection procedures during NRDA
- Bird deposition studies, and
- Restoration Meta-Analysis of Ecological benefits and financial costs.

Copies of these oil spill R&D recommendations are available on the Task Force web site (see address on page 33 below).

SPILL PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE TOPICS OF CONCERN

As under the Spill Prevention Objective, the Coordinating Committee has monitored and shared information on the following oil spill preparedness/response "topics of concern" throughout the past year:

- Unannounced drill programs
- Financial responsibility requirements, state and federal
- Spill reporting requirements as they apply to the US Navy and foreign-flag vessels operating outside of US territorial waters.
- Hazardous material spill contingency planning
- Response technologies, including research and development

■ *COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES:*

We continue our focus on public outreach and public involvement as well as improving communications among our member agencies. With regard to our public outreach efforts, the Executive Coordinator maintains a mailing list of over 900 interested persons in the US, Canada, and abroad. These persons receive notices of the roundtable discussions and annual meetings, as well as a request for Legacy Awards nominations. A review of our communications initiatives and events follows:

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

Stakeholders can monitor Task Force activities through our web site and our mailings, and can also participate in Task Force sponsored events or project workgroups. As noted in the section on our West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project, forty-one persons served as either members or alternates on that Workgroup, and another ten were provided with periodic updates on the project's progress. In addition, we did extensive public outreach to get input on the Workgroup's draft Findings and Recommendations. Please see page 6 above. We host two public events each year: a roundtable forum in the winter and our Annual Meeting in the summer. Please see pages 19 above for more information on the 2002 roundtable, which focused on Natural Resource Damage Assessment issues.

THE 2001 ANNUAL MEETING

Sixty people attended the 2001 Annual Meeting, which was held at the Hotel Grand Pacific on the harbor in Victoria, British Columbia. Derek Thompson, Deputy Minister for the Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection, the host of this year's meeting, chaired the meeting. Derek welcomed all participants and the other Task Force members, especially Gary Gill, our new member from the Hawaii Department of Health. He noted the value of the collaborative efforts of the Task Force Members as well as the stakeholders in the region. Jean Cameron explained that, with Hawaii's decision to join the Task Force, BC is now partnering with all the US states that border on the Pacific Ocean, thus the group's decision to change the organization's name to the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. Hawaii's decision to join also stimulated an update of the 1989 Memorandum of Cooperation which originally established the Task Force.

The Task Force members provided updates on their agencies' activities over the past year, followed by a keynote address co-presented by Martyn Green, Retired President, Burrard Clean Operations, and Roland Miller, Retired President, Clean Sound Cooperative. The title of the address was Cross Boundary Oil Transportation and Spill Response Issues, The Regulators and the Regulated - Where are We Today? Martyn and Roland noted that there have been many regulations adopted by the United States, Canada, the State of Washington, and the Province of British Columbia which apply to the oil industry. The response process focuses on oil spills in the open waters or ocean as would occur from a tank vessel. There is no doubt that oil spills on open waters or the ocean need a certain level of resources, but winds, tides and currents will rapidly move the oil to shore as has been the case in past oil spills. We need a rapid open water means to combat oil spills to minimize oil from hitting the shoreline, but we also

need to improve our shoreline response capability when and if it does, they advised.

Martyn also noted that "The discussions around alternative technologies have been agenda items for some 25 years to my certain knowledge, and we have made some progress. I do still maintain the vision of a large spill incident, where the utilization of an alternative technology, e.g. dispersants, could be instrumental in mitigating the impact of a serious incident." Response organizations in Canada are Coast Guard certified only on the basis of mechanical recovery; that there may be in-situ fire boom in their inventory is to the credit of their management and common sense; but be advised, this equipment will be used.

Martyn and Roland also noted that mutual aid agreements have now become a standard means to share resources and technology. "Several years ago Burrard Clean and Clean Sound recognized the vast expanses of our joint operating area. We agreed neither organization could cover the entire area and that financially the cost would be prohibitive," stated Roland. Oil, once spilled, knows no boundaries and moves with the wind and tide, they observed. A Canadian spill could end up in the US and vice versa. Therefore they formed the first mutual aid agreement between a US and a Canadian spill response organization. Memorandums of Agreement have been extended to include the South East Alaska Pollution Response Organization, providing a foundation for other response organizations to participate.

The need for a 'Northwest Response' has never been more apparent, they stated. Issues around management, communications, equipment compatibility and contractor resources are just a few of the challenges that face responders and government agencies alike, they emphasized. Martyn and Roland further called for an initiative to address the transboundary issues raised in their address, specifically alternative technology use and the government decision making processes relevant to the transboundary movement of goods and personnel. There are also issues to be resolved regarding compatible communications equipment and availability under emergency situations. There are also issues regarding responder immunity. The Joint Canada/US Contingency Plan resolves many, but not all, such issues, they noted.

The Task Force Members then made their 2001 Legacy Awards to the Tesoro Alaska Company; Clean Seas, LLC, Island Tug and Barge Ltd.; the California State Lands Commission, Marine Facilities Division; and a team award to the Canadian Coast Guard, Marine Communications and Traffic Services; Transport Canada Marine Safety; and the US Coast Guard Marine

Safety Office Puget Sound. Please see page 26 below for more details on these winners.

Following lunch, Rick Holly, Field Operations Supervisor for the Office of Spill Prevention and Response of the California Department of Fish and Game and Commander Bill Uberti, Deputy Chief of the US Coast Guard's Pacific Area Marine Safety Division, Co-Chairs of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project, reported to the Task Force Members and meeting attendees on the project's status. (Please reference pages 6-15 in the 2001 Annual Report for details). CDR Uberti and CAPT Holly explained that, over the coming year, the WCOVTRM Project Workgroup planned to draw conclusions from the data and risk assessment, evaluate the risks, and make recommendations to address those risks. Of the risk factors which they felt they could impact with such recommendations, they have chosen to focus on Distance Offshore, Higher Collision Areas, Tug Availability, and Historical Casualty rates by vessel type. (Please reference pages 6-17 of this 2002 Annual Report).

The final presentation to the Task Force Members and audience was made by Dr. Roger Helm, manager of Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) projects for the Western Region of the US Fish and Wildlife service, a region which includes all the Task Force member jurisdictions except British Columbia. His talk was titled Natural Resource Damage Assess: A Reality Check. The legal authorities for NRDA include the US Clean Water Act, CERCLA, and OPA 90. He noted that successful NRDA involves cooperation among state, federal, and tribal government trustee agencies. Such collaboration would be further enhanced if Canada and Mexico were involved in transboundary events, Dr. Helm stated. During the question and answer session, it was explained that Canada subscribes to IMO's Cleanup Liability Convention of 1992, which prohibits funding for environmental restoration and also limits the responsible party's liability overall, unlike in the US.

The goal of NRDA is to leave the environment cleaner; it's a tool for restoration, not a penalty...although, he admitted, it can be painful. By virtue of this reality, however, NRDA has probably contributed to more investment in spill prevention, and thus, fewer spills. The process of quantifying the scale and extent of environmental injury requires scientific analysis, which can be time-consuming, and it benefits from cooperation among the scientists representing both the trustees and the responsible party. He noted that the history of successful cooperation was stronger on the West Coast than the East or Gulf Coasts. When asked later why he thought this was the case, he attributed it to a combination of a stronger environmental ethic and a history of cooperation among trustee agencies.

When the Task Force Members invited attendees to provide comments, Joe Cox of the Chamber of Shipping of America stated that he was impressed to see the Pacific States and British Columbia making a voluntary effort to work together. He recommended that the Task Force get more involved in coordination of ballast water issues, which have both national and international implications. He also noted that the INTERTANKO v Locke lawsuit involved the US federal government and cautioned the states not to overreach on regulatory issues. He noted, however, that national policy has to allow for local variations, and stated that industry was eager to work on local solutions. He also cautioned against criminalization of spills. On the issue of unannounced drills, he cautioned against targeting one company for more than one drill or in more than one state. Dale Ferriere of TeeKay Shipping cautioned the states against developing different standards for mid-ocean ballast water exchanges. He also recommended that the Canadian responders adopt the Unified Command/Incident Command System paradigm. USCG Captain John Veentjer responded that the US/Canadian Joint Response Team is working to ensure that a coordinated response occurs. Peter Woodward of the Council of Marine Carriers commented that there was a national effort in Canada towards consistency on oil spill issues/policies.

The Meeting closed following a report by Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator, on the status of Task Force projects undertaken the past year (see details in the 2001 Annual Report), as well as a preview of upcoming projects as authorized by the Members as they signed the 2001-2002 Annual Workplan. Stan Norman invited the Task Force Members to Washington State for their 2002 Annual Meeting. A reception immediately following the Annual Meeting was graciously hosted by the British Columbia Chamber of Shipping, Burrard CleanBurrard Clean Operations, the Council of Marine Carriers, and Clean Sound Cooperative, Inc.

THE 2001 LEGACY AWARDS

The Legacy Award categories include industry, non-profit or public agency organizations, individuals, and team efforts. The Task Force gives Legacy Awards in these categories for projects, accomplishments, or leadership that demonstrates innovation, management commitment, and improvements in oil spill prevention, preparedness, or response resulting in enhanced environmental protection. Efforts to promote partnerships and involve the public are also considered. Organizations or individuals nominated for the Legacy Award must be located or primarily operating in the Task Force jurisdictions of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, California (and Hawaii effective August 1, 2001). Organizations or individuals representing a regulated industry must demonstrate a satisfactory history of compliance with state, provincial, and federal oil spill regulations.

Five 2001 Legacy Awards were presented as follows:

Tesoro Alaska Company:
Tesoro Alaska Company has established a record of successful, collaborative efforts to reduce the likelihood of marine oil spills and related environmental impacts. These include voluntary application of state-of-the-art technologies; engagement in the communities around their operations; and a willingness to seek constructive solutions in cooperation with all players.

Tesoro undertook a long-term charter for a new OPA-90 "Double-Hull" tank vessel to operate on the West Coast including Alaska and Hawaii, and has recently signed another charter agreement for a second OPA-90 double hull tanker to operate in those same areas. This commitment provides a second layer of protection in the harsh operating environment of these vessels, especially the Pacific Northwest and the Gulf of Alaska, and has been implemented before actually required by law.

Cook Inlet provides a unique challenge to shipping operations including occasional ice conditions, currents exceeding 6 knots, and a 30 foot tidal range. In the face of these challenges, Tesoro upgraded the mooring system at their Kenai Pipe Line Facility on Cook Inlet to provide an immediate update to facility and vessel operators of line tensions that could develop into potential problems. Tesoro also developed steps to safely operate vessels in Cook Inlet during winter periods with extreme ice conditions; these prevention measures have been accepted by local marine pilots and serve as an example to other area shippers.

Tesoro Alaska Company also played an important role in the development of Geographic Response Strategies (GRS) in Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, and Kachemak Bay, with more planned for the future. Tesoro's "Industry Response Team" (IRT) personnel conducted GRS exercises on Kodiak Island. The IRT's train and deploy equipment alongside the Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and Response (CISPRI) personnel; they can supplement CISPRI responders or act as team leaders.

Tesoro has also been proactive in its involvement with the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (CIRCAC), providing vessel and facility tours, conducting training, and allowing for their participation in the company's Spill Management Team. In a letter supporting Tesoro's nomination, CIRCAC stated: "The success of the Cook Inlet GRS work is directly related to the efforts of Tesoro Alaska Company."

Gene Burden serves as President of Tesoro Alaska Company and John Kwietniak is Supervisor for Contingency Planning.

Clean Seas, LLC:

Clean Seas, formed in 1970, was the first fully manned and funded oil spill cooperative in the US. Many industry oil spill cooperatives have been modeled after Clean Seas. During the last decade, Clean Seas has been instrumental in improving oil spill response technology and systems. Some of their innovations and initiatives include:

- The concept of a "Fisherman's Oil Spill Response Team," developed in 1990, which has proven to be an effective use of resources already available in most western ports;
- Clean Seas designed and built the first mobile oiled wildlife cleaning trailer, and donated it to the state spill response agency;
- Clean Seas designed and built a fast recovery vessel with built-in skimming systems; similar systems have since been adopted by other cooperatives;
- Clean Seas combined a low cost storage barge with a brush skimmer to create an effective, low maintenance, low tech, and inexpensive skimming system;
- Clean Seas developed an extensive spill response training and drill program involving more than 1500 people each year;
- Clean Seas developed its own equipment cleaning facility to insure that equipment is cleaned and back in service as soon as possible following a spill event; and
- Clean Seas negotiated with the US Coast Guard (USCG) on behalf of APICOM (Association of Petroleum Industry Cooperative Managers) to develop a "basic ordering agreement" that allows the USCG to hire coops to respond to spills when the responsible party is either unknown or unable to mount an adequate response.

Darryle Waldron is General Manager of Clean Seas, LLC and has provided the leadership for these important initiatives.

Island Tug and Barge Ltd.

Island Tug and Barge Ltd. (ITB) is the major provider of petroleum products transportation on the West Coast of British Columbia, and operates in the US from SE Alaska to Oregon. Carrying gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, and deck cargo, ITB tugs and barges call at major ports as well as small coastal BC communities. ITB customers include Chevron Canada Ltd., Imperial Oil Ltd., Petro-Canada, and Petro Marine Services. For the year 2000, ITB made 850 deliveries totaling 1.35 billion liters of product with no spills into water.

ITB's policies, operating and maintenance procedures, training programs, and equipment are setting a high standard for the marine transportation industry. Key achievements in spill prevention and response preparedness include:

- As a voluntary step, ITB was issued an International Safety Management (ISM) Document of Compliance by Lloyds Register in March of this year. They also received Safety Management Certificates for the five tugs and barges put forward for certification.
- Also in March, ITB was issued an ISO 9002 Certificate of Approval by the Lloyds Register Quality Assurance program. This required clear articulation of ITB's best practices, including watch-keeping, oil product handling, testing, and delivery.
- ITB took delivery in 1998 of a double-hulled, coastal, light fuel products barge, the first of its type in Canada and the first equipped with vapor recovery. A double-hulled bunkering barge was also scheduled for delivery in June 2001.
- Although not required by regulations to do so, all ITB tow boats under 400 GRT have Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans.
- ITB has been a response contractor for Burrard Clean Operation; in addition, IBT President Bob Shields serves on the Board of Directors for SEAPRO, SE Alaska's spill response organization.
- ITB covers the internal exercises identified by the US Coast Guard's Preparedness for Response Exercise Program each year, rather than on a three-year cycle as recommended.
- All ITB barges carry a minimum of 300 feet of inshore containment boom and 1000 feet for barges engaged in trans-border service.
- In September of 2000, ITB was granted Associate Membership status in the Voluntary Best Achievable Protection program run by the Washington Department of Ecology for tank barges. ITB next plans to achieve compliance with Ecology's Exceptional Compliance Standards (ECOPRO).
- ITB is converting its barges to vapor recovery closed loading systems with overfill protection; currently three have been converted. ITB tugs are equipped with integrated computer charting and differential GPS and ECDIS. ITB tugs are also equipped with satellite stations for global communication and tracking.

Captain Bob Shields serves as President of Island Tug and Barge, Ltd., Captain Jack Davies is the Vice President, and Steve Pollock serves as General Manager.

California State Lands Commission, Marine Facilities Division:
Marine Facilities Division (MFD) of the California State Lands Commission (CSLC) will receive a 2001 Legacy Award for developing a no-cost, voluntary Safety Assessment of Management Systems (SAMS) for the marine industry. SAMS was first developed in 1997 as a joint industry project intended to provide a link between research on human and organizational factors and a practical field application in safety and

environmental protection. MFD recognized a need not only to regulate and strictly enforce rules, but also to reach out and provide a useful tool that would assist industry customers in meeting oil spill prevention objectives.

The following organizations made up the initial Joint Industry Project (JIP) team that created SAMS: the American Bureau of Shipping; the California State Lands Commission; Chevron Petroleum Technology Company; the National Energy Board of Canada; Texaco, Inc.; the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive; the US Minerals Management Service; and Paragon Engineering.

The SAMS process begins with a kickoff meeting during which MFD specialists schedule on-site interviews with company personnel. These interviews include a cross-section of the organization, from upper-level managers to line-supervisors, administrative staff, operators and contractors. The process usually occurs over a three-to-five day period and every effort is made to minimize the impact on workplace operations. Confidentiality of interviewees, as well as the report product, is assured in order to obtain the openness necessary for a realistic appraisal of the company. After compiling the interviews, MFD specialists return to the company to report results, and clarify any issues contained in the report. Findings from the assessment are presented to the company in a non-regulatory, informal manner. The findings are a means of supporting the company's subsequent, prioritized efforts at safety improvement.

The research-developed SAMS question manual guides the interviews. Company safety and environmental protection program documents are reviewed. Nine safety areas are targeted by the assessment, including management and organizational issues, hazards analysis, management of change, operating procedures, safe work practices, training and selection, mechanical integrity, emergency response, and investigation and audit.

SAMS assessments have been at eleven facilities. Feedback from customers has been quite positive, including kudos such as "...found your assessment to be thorough, systematic, fair and accurate", and "Your written review included many insightful observations and suggestions to which we have already responded."

This innovative partnership between government and the regulated industry exceeds regulatory requirements and works mutually toward a higher level of environmental excellence. The result? A greater commitment toward spill prevention and safety fostered by proactive public service and industry involvement.

For more than ten years CSLC has had the primary responsibility for oil spill prevention at California marine facilities. California's oil spill legislation requires agencies to provide for the best achievable protection of the environment as well as public health and safety. Though CSLC is primarily concerned with marine facility operations, the SAMS model has been applied to transportation companies, and assessment questions are applicable to other industries as well. Gary Gregory is Chief of the Marine Facilities Division.

Canadian Coast Guard, Marine Communications and Traffic Services; Transport Canada Marine Safety; and the US Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Puget Sound:

Over the last year, the US Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Puget Sound and Transport Canada Marine Safety Vancouver, with the direct assistance of the Canadian Coast Guard Marine Communications and Traffic Services, have harmonized their vessel movement control efforts to unprecedented levels. In particular, the Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service (CVTS) Disabled Participating Vessel Matrix marked an important transition from independent program decisions by these various agencies into an integrated unified and effective risk assessment approach for all organizations.

The CVTS Disabled Participating Vessel Matrix is applied to vessels with reduced capabilities operating in the shared US/Canadian area of responsibility. Moreover, it provides clear direction when an assist tug is required to mitigate risks associated with disabled vessels. As a direct result of the international cooperation between these public agencies, there are numerous examples where these organizations have worked cooperatively to mitigate the substantial risk of oil pollution to the sensitive marine environment of the Puget Sound region through unified guidance, policy and enforcement efforts.

The complex Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service (CVTS) includes Tofino Traffic, Victoria Traffic, Vancouver Traffic, and Seattle Traffic which manages commercial traffic for the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Haro Strait, the Strait of Georgia and the Puget Sound region. Vessels utilizing the CVTS may provide a combined US/Canadian Advanced Notice of Arrival (ANA) directly to the Regional Marine Information Center which requests additional information such as mechanical defects and dangerous goods on board the vessel. Upon receiving an ANA for a vessel bound to a US or Canadian Port, it will be forwarded to both the US Coast Guard and Transport Canada.



There have been several meetings with key personnel from both the US and Canadian agencies to improve communication during multi-national responses, e.g., vessel adrift/propulsion problems in joint US/Canadian waters. During the year 2000, tug use was required 31 times to mitigate the risks of vessels with reduced capabilities. In addition there has been effective harmonization of US and Canadian operational safety measures, such as requiring an additional navigation officer in restricted visibility and inoperative navigation safety equipment, a stand-by tug while a deep draft vessel conducts maintenance at anchor, etc.

Marine Safety Office Puget Sound personnel conducted professional exchanges with Transport Canada Office of Marine Safety inspectors to improve understanding of each other's inspection procedures and improve regional Port State Control cooperation and enforcement. The objective was to harmonize vessel movement control enforcement efforts. In addition, the professional exchanges focused on sharing Port State Control information and improved communications among field inspectors. Both the US Coast Guard and Transport Canada have similar goals and objectives with vessel safety, training, pollution response and Port State Control.

US and Canadian personnel conducted a joint pollution investigation on a large bulk carrier as follow-up to an oil spill that occurred on the Columbia River near Portland, Oregon in March 2001. Transport Canada boarded the vessel immediately upon notification and obtained numerous fuel oil samples on behalf of the US Coast Guard. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Office in Portland had these samples analyzed and was able to identify the source vessel.

The agencies have also unified vessel enforcement decisions. For example, the bulk carrier DORTHEA OLDENDORFF, inbound to Vancouver, BC experienced reduced propulsion when transiting through US waters. The US Coast Guard MSO Puget Sound contacted Transport Canada and drafted a first of its kind "unified" Captain of the Port Order that directed the vessel to obtain the services of an assist tug, to anchor in Royal Roads for repair, and to await inspection by Transport Canada.

As a result of these preventive measures, there has been measurable improvement in response time for vessel propulsion or mechanical failures. CAPT Michael Moore is the US Coast Guard Captain of the Port for Puget Sound; Yvette Myers heads the Canadian Coast Guard's Marine Programs, and CAPT John Yeung represents Transport Canada, Marine Safety, for this project.

The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force congratulates the winners of the 2001 Legacy Award. For information on the 1999 and 2000 winners, please visit our web site.

TASK FORCE WEB SITE

The British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection continues to maintain a site on the World Wide Web for the Task Force. The following information is available from the home page:

- An overview of Task Force;
- A map of the Task Force's area of interest;
- A list of Task Force Members and Coordinating Committee, with contact information;
- Copies of the current Strategic Plan, Annual Workplan, and the latest Annual Report;
- Recent Correspondence and Comments submitted by the Task Force;
- The latest edition of our newsletter, Quarterly Report to Our Stakeholders;
- Cooperative Agreements and Resolutions adopted by the Task Force Members;
- Task Force Project Reports;
- Summary Notes of the most recent Annual and Coordinating Committee Meetings;
- Connections to Internet sites for Task Force Member and Federal Agencies; and
- Upcoming Task Force event information.

Please visit our site on at:
http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm

OTHER TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

- Pursuant to our focus on submitting Task Force consensus comments on federal initiatives which would impact our programs or policies, the Executive Coordinator tracks rulemaking activities and notifies member agencies of opportunities for comment on relevant proposals.
- The Task Force Coordinating Committee met with representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency's Region 9 during their Winter Quarterly meeting. They discussed EPA's role during an OPA spill response and EPA sponsored training events, as well as state/EPA coordination of inspections. The Committee also met with representatives from the US Coast Guard's Pacific Area Marine Safety Division during their Spring meeting, and addressed a range of topics including USCG priority changes post September 11, 2001

and changes in spill response relationships with states; varying approaches to OSRO evaluations; approaches to contingency planning, and Implementation protocols for USCG/State Memorandums of Agreement.

- The Task Force responds to information requests from students, regulators, journalists, professionals, and concerned citizens worldwide. From August of 2001 through April of 2002, the Task Force has responded to information requests from the US, Canada, Italy, and Australia.
- Jean Cameron represents the Task Force on the Pacific Region Quality Steering Committee of the American Waterways Operators and the US Coast Guard. This team is focused on improving safety in barge and towing operations on the West Coast. Stan Norman of the Washington Department of Ecology serves as the Task Force's alternate.
- Jean Cameron also serves as a member of the US Coast Guard's Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC), where she works with representatives of the maritime community to prevent oil spills by promoting navigation safety through applications and revisions to both the inland and international "rules of the road," advice on implementation of the Coast Guard's Prevention Through People program, and review of safety issues associated with developments in maritime and navigation technology.
- Staff from the Task Force member agencies and the Executive Coordinator participated in the 2002 National Maritime Salvage Conference sponsored by the US Coast Guard in Seattle in January of 2002. Task Force members adopted a resolution in 1994 in support of "policy initiatives to support salvage capability on the West Coast", and we are glad to see the US Coast Guard working with the salvage industry to address this issue.
- Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator, attended the February 2002 meeting of the American Petroleum Institute's Spills Advisory Group and updated them on Task Force activities and projects.
- Ms. Cameron also provided the luncheon address for the 2002 Spring Meeting of the American Waterways Operators Pacific Region. She gave them an overview of Task Force activities with particular emphasis on the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management project.
- The Coordinating Committee of the Task Force held its quarterly meetings in Victoria, BC, Olympia, Washington, and Concord, California over this past work year. These meetings provide opportunities for information exchange and decisions on implementation of projects outlined in our Annual Workplan.

- The Task Force member agencies routinely exchange information on their initiatives and activities. In addition, the Task Force office maintains a directory of member agency staff that includes information on their program areas and ICS specialties, thus facilitating both information exchange between agencies as well as expertise exchange during spill responses.





Task Force Member Agency Activities and Accomplishments

In addition to their dedication of staff and resources to Oil Spill Task Force projects, our member agencies have been involved in a wide range of initiatives in their own jurisdictions, as outlined below:

HAWAII:

The Hazards Evaluation and Emergency Response Office of the Environmental Health Administration in the Hawaii Department of Health (HEER)

❑ In general, the function of the HEER Office is to plan for and respond to hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant and oil releases to the environment. The HEER Office evaluates actual or potential impacts such releases may have on the public, the environment, and natural resources, and mitigates them as needed. The HEER Office is staffed with professionals able to assess chemical risks, evaluate the extent of chemical contamination, formulate response plans, oversee remediation, and actually conduct response activities. In addition, the HEER Office coordinates statewide planning activities to prepare for and respond to chemical and oil spills in the environment.

❑ During FY 2001, the HEER Office received 465 notifications concerning the release of a hazardous chemicals or oil spills. Out of the 465 notifications reported, 222 required a site visit by a State On-Scene-Coordinator (SOSC) and/or off-scene coordination and response. Notable among the spill responses during FY 2001 were the Honolulu Harbor Area-Wide Contamination Rapid Assessment and the Puuwai Momi Mercury Removal, as described below. There were 143 oil releases and 276 hazmat events. Causes of oil spills included equipment failure (41%), operator error (25%), traffic/vessel accidents (9%), unknown (15%), and "other" such as dumping (10%).

❑ THE HONOLULU HARBOR AREA-WIDE CONTAMINATION RAPID ASSESSMENT: The Honolulu Harbor Area-Wide Contamination Rapid Assessment site was the highest profile response site for FY 2001. The response was unique in that it dealt with a vast area, connecting many properties and businesses with a similar hazardous waste contaminant. The working group is cooperating by way of a voluntary agreement to: 1) Complete a rapid assessment of the Iwilei Unit pipelines along the

shoreline of Honolulu Harbor and moving inland; 2) do an expedited removal of contaminants, when necessary; 3) perform cleanup tasks in an agreed period of time; and finally, use the most appropriate methods and technologies available. The rapid assessment requires cooperation between the State Department of Health, Office of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response, the State Department of Transportation, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region IX, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Participating Parties representing private business.

❑ On February 1, 2001, the Honolulu Harbor Participating Parties (HHPP), entered into an Environmental Response Working Agreement to respond to subsurface petroleum contamination and to continue response efforts in the Honolulu Harbor area of Oahu. This extensive area-wide contamination was first identified in 1995 when State On-Scene Coordinators (SOSCs) from the HEER Office and EPA Region 9 Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) first established a collective method for response in areas where contamination is evident and connecting large areas of property.

❑ The Honolulu Harbor site is divided into four workable units. During FY 2001, response efforts focused on contamination identified in the Iwilei Unit area. The Iwilei unit is bounded by Honolulu Harbor to the south, Kapalama Canal to the west, Dillingham Boulevard and North King Street to the north and Nuuanu Stream to the east. The Iwilei Unit area consists of a vast network of underground pipelines and petroleum storage facilities, many of which are now being discovered during investigatory soil borings and excavation.

❑ The overall goal of the Environmental Response Working Agreement is to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to solve past, present, and future environmental contamination problems in the Honolulu Harbor area. The desired endpoints are to achieve overall compliance, future prevention and cleanup of petroleum contamination. The EPA is actively supporting and participating in this effort.

❑ THE PUUWAI MOMI MERCURY REMOVAL: In FY 2001, the Puuwai Momi Mercury Removal was the second high profile incident. This emergency response took our office to the highest state of response involving nearly the entire office in a coordinated effort to ensure the safety of those exposed, many of which were children.

❑ Control of the incident site was the priority in the first few hours after the release was discovered. Using an incident command coordinated response, a State On-Scene Coordinator from the HEER Office took the



lead, working with other Federal, State and City and County of Honolulu response teams. This was one of the largest non-petroleum related releases ever to happen in Hawaii. It was of particular concern due to the large quantity of mercury having the potential of becoming volatile. Once heated in the warm Hawaiian sunlight mercury becomes potentially more readily absorbable by people through inhalation.

❑ The Honolulu Fire Department's Hazardous Materials Unit notified the HEER Office on March 12, 2001 of a mercury contamination incident at the Puuwai Momi state managed housing complex. A State On-Scene Coordinator from the HEER Office responded and determined that the mercury contamination was a high priority emergency. Response efforts at the housing complex was immediately initiated and continued on through April 6, 2001. Seventy-one units out of a total of 261 units in the complex required a specialized response protocol and personal protective measures to contain the mercury. Approximately 4.4 pounds of free elemental mercury was recovered at the complex. The source of the mercury was an old water pump flow-meter left in an abandoned water pump station located near the housing complex. The pump station, once owned by the Navy, had been abandoned some time in the early 1960's when the Navy turned the land over to the State of Hawaii. The HEER Office response efforts recovered approximately 30 pounds of free mercury from the pump house. The State of Hawaii funded the $622,462 cost for cleanup, through the Environmental Response Revolving Fund (ERRF) and will be seeking reimbursement for the ERRF from the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR). The DLNR will be requesting the appropriation from the 2002 Legislature.

❑ Additional information about the environmental program and available documents can be obtained at the Department of Health web site at: www.hawaii.gov/health/eh

ALASKA:

The Division of Spill Prevention and Response, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)

❑ ADEC received reports of 1,785 oil spills, 48 brine spills, and 449 hazardous substance spills in calendar year 2001. The Department conducted 2,165 field responses to oil spills, 4 field responses to brine spills, and 33 field responses to hazardous substance spills. The Department estimates that 484,762 gallons of oil, 103,362 gallons of brine and 128,988 gallons of hazardous substances were spilled in 2001.



❑ Of the twenty-five oil spills exceeding the Task Force data threshold of 500 gallons to land and one barrel to water, 14 were from facilities, four from fishing vessels, two from pipelines, two from aircraft, and one from a truck. The source of two of these oil spills was unknown. No causal information was provided.

❑ ADEC responded to four spills which required a significant State response effort, including incident management and oversight, shoreline cleanup assessment, and communications support. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline was punctured by a bullet at milepost 400, approximately 45 miles north of Fairbanks, which resulted in a shutdown of the pipeline and a spill of 285,000 gallons of crude oil. The F/V Vanguard hit ice in Prince William Sound and sank with 2000 gallons of diesel and 500 gallons of gasoline aboard. As the Vanguard response was being demobilized, the F/V Windy Bay sank with 35,000 gallons of diesel fuel after striking a rock about 6 miles west of the Vanguard sinking. The Tesoro pipeline spill near Nikiski resulted in the discharge of an undetermined amount of refined petroleum to soil and wetlands. In addition to these incidents, there were multiple spills in Cook Inlet and the North Slope associated with aging petroleum pipelines.

❑ ADEC is continuing to implement new legislation requiring oil spill contingency plans for certain non-tank vessels and railroad operations that carry or transport substantial amounts of fuel. There are approximately 1000 non-tank vessels of over 400 gross tons and one railroad operation (the Alaska Railroad) subject to these regulations under a bill that was signed into law on April 6, 2001. ADEC has been developing regulations over the past year, holding public workshops and a formal public review period. Regulations should become final by the fall of 2002. Newly regulated operators will have six months from the effective date of the new regulations to submit contingency plans to ADEC for review and approval.

❑ As part of its continuing efforts to test industry and government response effectiveness, ADEC participated in an industry test of a cold oil-water emulsion pumping system in October 2001. The test, a follow-up to the 1999 and 2000 North Slope broken ice field tests, simulated potential conditions during the offloading of an oil spill recovery barge. The test showed that the system is capable of pumping the emulsion, but that heating the emulsion would improve its flow characteristics and pumping rate. Based on recommendations from this test, a subsequent pumping test using a heating system is planned for the fall of 2002.

❑ ADEC continues to work with BP Exploration and Phillips Alaska to implement the Charter Agreement for the Alaska North Slope. This agreement was developed as part of the 1999 BP-ARCO merger and signed by the State of Alaska, BP and Phillips. The Charter's environmental commitments include a pledge by industry to spend over $15 million during the following ten years to clean up and improve oil spill response on Alaska's North Slope. ADEC has compiled a report of accomplishments covering 2001, the second full year of the agreement's implementation.

❑ ADEC, the U. S. Coast Guard, and the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency published Revision 1 of the In Situ Burning Guidelines for Alaska. The revised guidelines address in situ burning of oil on flat terrain and on water and are based on the ALOFT-Flat Terrain Model developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The Alaska Regional Response Team has not yet approved the revised guidelines. When they receive ARRT approval they will be included in future revisions to the Alaska State/Federal Unified Plan.

❑ ADEC is continuing its public outreach and education effort to address home heating oil tank spills. These tanks are a significant spill source in Alaska and pose major health risks in residential areas that rely on shallow groundwater as a drinking water source. ADEC has developed and distributed a manual for homeowners, as well as pamphlets covering tank installation, tank maintenance, and tips for buyers and sellers of homes with heating oil tanks. The educational materials are available on the ADEC web site (http://www.state.ak.us/dec/dspar/stp/heat.htm) and have been distributed at state fairs and home shows.

❑ Spill response equipment has been ordered and some equipment has been delivered as a result of the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line settlement. Construction of two 47-foot response vessels was halted when it was discovered that a change in the manufacturing process for the aluminum plating rendered it subject to rapid corrosion in saltwater. This will delay delivery of the vessels until the problem is resolved between the aluminum manufacturer and the boat-building company. ADEC co-chairs a working group to use other settlement monies to develop geographic response strategies for sixty sites in Southeast Alaska, which will be completed in 2003.

❑ ADEC conducted a community hazardous materials (hazmat) project in the Bristol Bay sub-area last April. The project included classroom training, non-regulatory technical assistance visits to facilities that use extremely hazardous substances, basic and advanced ICS training, and a local response tabletop exercise. A future exercise is planned for the Denali Borough. ADEC also participated in a U.S. Coast Guard hazmat

exercise in Whittier in June 2001 which also involved local, State and federal government and industry representatives. Another major Level A hazmat joint deployment exercise is tentatively scheduled for the fall of 2002.

❑ The final version of the Northwest Arctic, Bristol Bay, and Western Alaska Sub-area Contingency Plans were published and distributed in June 2001. All ten sub-area plans have now been published. The existing plans undergo periodic revisions and improvements. Several workgroups are currently developing geographic response strategies for sensitive areas within the planning sub-areas for addition to the sub-area plans.

❑ ADEC continues to work with local communities around the state to provide for cooperative spill response and address local preparedness needs. There are now thirty-eight Community Spill Response Agreements in place between ADEC and Alaskan local governments. These agreements allow reimbursement to local governments for costs incurred from response activities undertaken at ADEC direction. Enhancements to local spill readiness and capability will continue as needs and deficiencies are identified through the evolving sub-area contingency plans.

❑ Additional information about the program and available documents can be obtained at the ADEC web site at:
http://www.state.ak.us/dec/dspar/dec_dspr.htm

WASHINGTON:

SPILL PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY

(Please note: This report covers calendar year 2001. It does not include events and developments after January 1, 2002.)

❑ The Spills Program Prevention Section Field Offices in Portland and Seattle inspected 1,090 vessels in 2001, exceeding the previous high year mark of 919 inspections in 1999. There were 5,208 vessel-entering transits to Washington waters in 2001, down from 5,652 in 2000.

❑ The rate of reported oil spills from vessels over the last year showed a clear downward trend. The overall vessel incident rate continued a three-year upward trend, however, due entirely to an increase in the vessel casualty rate. The major contributor to the decreased spill rate has been a decrease in the number of spills by fishing vessels since mid-2000. The

major contributors to the increase in vessel casualties are cargo, passenger, and tank vessels.

❑ Washington's bunker monitoring inspection activities appear to be paying off. Vessels that have undergone a bunker monitoring inspection continue to show a significantly decreased rate of spills from bunkering operations, as compared to the "All vessel rate." They have had no spills within 60 days following the inspection. The rate of spills continues to show a substantial reduction up to 180 days following the inspection. This reflects the success of our vessel inspection activities in educating vessel operators on procedures to follow to prevent bunkering spills. Recognizing this influence on the spill rate, Spills Program inspectors increased the number of bunker monitor inspections to 55 percent of all compliance inspections. (In 1999, 38 percent of the compliance inspections were bunker monitor inspections; in 2000 the rate was 41 percent.)

❑ The Voluntary Best Achievable Protection Program (VBAP) continued to expand in its second year. There are 36 tank ship and tank barge companies from 14 foreign countries and the U.S. participating. Under this program, owners and operators voluntarily meet the BAP standards, increasing their overall level of marine safety and reducing the probability of a spill. Two of the three companies operating tank ships in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System trade are enrolled in the program. This represents approximately two-thirds of crude oil tanker entries into Washington waters during 2001.

❑ The multi-stakeholder North Puget Sound Oil Spill Risk Management Panel completed its work in 2000 with a list of 24 separate recommendations to improve marine safety in the area. The Department of Ecology, the U.S. Coast Guard and the broader community made considerable progress on several of these recommendations during 2001, primarily through the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee.

❑ On May 25, 2001 Washington Governor Gary Locke and Coast Guard Rear Admiral Erroll M. Brown, Commander 13th Coast Guard District, signed a memorandum of agreement on oil pollution prevention and response. The agreement culminated many years of close cooperation between the Coast Guard and Department of Ecology. It documents the strong partnership between the agencies and establishes a plan for developing an even closer day-to-day working relationship. The state and the Coast Guard have further agreed to develop the following protocols:

- Coordinating inspections on bulk oil transfer facilities.
- Sharing information related to marine transportation safety.
- Coordinating efforts on media relations during spill events.

- Developing a coordinated vessel inspection program.
- Monitoring oil transfers.
- Coordinating the review of oil spill contingency plans.
- Oil spill response drills.
- Sharing information on incident investigations.

❑ While the Department and the Coast Guard have made some progress on the protocols, protocol development and implementation has slowed since the Coast Guard has had to reemphasize their port security mission following the events of September 11.

❑ In 2001, the dedicated rescue tug began its third winter season stationed at Neah Bay. During 2001, the tug assisted eight vessels. (For a total of 18 assists in its three seasons on-station.) The highlight of this year's deployment was the tug's participation in the rescue of the decommissioned oil tanker Atigun Pass during a major Pacific storm over Thanksgiving weekend. The tanker was being towed by the tug De Da from Portland, Oregon to China to be scrapped. The towline parted and the tanker drifted north, pushed by a major storm, until it was off the Washington coast. The Washington rescue tug Barbara Foss was the first tug on-scene. Its maneuverability, specialized equipment, and highly trained crew played a critical role in the tanker's ultimate rescue.

❑ Other incidents where the rescue tug was called into play included a chemical tanker carrying liquid caustic soda that had engine trouble in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a tugboat towing a barge loaded with two million gallons of gasoline that had engine trouble off Cape Flattery, and a commercial fishing vessel crippled by contaminated fuel that needed standby assistance as it traveled to Port Angeles during a major storm.

❑ Besides responding to emergency incidents, the Barbara Foss participated in a no-notice spill response equipment deployment drill with Polar Tankers, Inc.

❑ The 2001 Legislature provided $1.35 million for the dedicated rescue tug and for providing an additional "stand-by tug" capability. The stand-by tug fund allows the Department of Ecology to spot charter and pre-position tugs as a preventative measure, during periods of increased risk, when requested by the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port. Ecology continued to pursue long-term, federal funding to make the dedicated tug a permanent spill prevention measure for the waters of Washington.

❑ The drill program has revealed some common deficiencies. Most of the vessel and facility spill management team members only work within the

Incident Command System during drills and spills. That means that in Washington most Spill Management Teams only practice their roles and responsibilities once a year. Many of the plan holders have difficulty with the Incident Command System process and procedures depicted in their plans. The Department offers training on the process to any company requesting it.

❑ The agency has also found that many plan holders assign roles on the spill management team based on the role of the person within the organization, rather than on the suitability of the individual. The Department has found that many of the roles within the Incident Command System require an aggressive personality and is advising plan holders to assign positions based on capabilities, not hierarchy within the organization.

❑ During 2001, the Department of Ecology continued to solicit informal feedback on potential changes to the state's vessel and facility oil spill contingency plan rules. The rule amendment process should begin in earnest during the first quarter of 2002.

❑ During 2001, the Spills Program:

- Received 4,507 referrals to follow up regarding spills reported in Washington. There were 1,582 referrals for petroleum products, 315 referrals for hazardous substances, 1,863 referrals for substances from clandestine drug labs, and 847 referrals for miscellaneous substances.
- Conducted 2,357 field responses for those referrals. Of those field responses, 374 were to incidents involving oil, and 1,605 were to clandestine drug lab cleanup sites.
- Only twenty nine of these oil spills were above the Task Force reporting thresholds of 500 gallons to land and one barrel (42 gallons) to water. Sources included vessels (10), vehicles (4), pipeline (1), facilities (2), rail (3), aboveground storage tanks (3), "other" (4), and unknown (2). Nine of these were caused by human error, nine by equipment or material failure, four by traffic accidents, three by external causes, and four were recorded as unknown causes.
- Participated in and evaluated 105 spill preparedness drills at regulated oil-handling facilities – 35 tabletop drills and 70 equipment deployment drills. Approximately 91 percent of the facilities met the deployment exercise requirement, and approximately 93 percent met the tabletop exercise requirement.
- Participated in and evaluated three tabletop exercises by vessel oil spill contingency plan holders.

- Held a no-notice spill response equipment deployment drill with Polar Tankers, Inc. Through the exercise, the company and the agency learned that some critical equipment had been moved, additional training was needed to address safety and operational issues, and some of the equipment depicted in the company's contingency plan was not appropriate for the operating environment. The Department and Polar Tankers, Inc. worked together to solve the problems.
- Created and posted four "Pictures of the Month" and three "Events of the Month" on the agency Web pages to highlight marine safety incidents.
- Published two prevention bulletins. One bulletin was on an incident in 1999, when the tanker ARCO TEXAS pulled away from a dock in Ferndale, Washington while unloading crude oil. This resulted in a 300-gallon spill, and damaged the oil handling facility and the ship. The prevention bulletin dealt with the importance of maintaining mooring equipment and the need to treat mooring equipment as a safety-critical system. The other prevention bulletin involved the cargo ship SUPER RUBIN. In 1999, the SUPER RUBIN spilled oil when fueling from a barge while anchored in the Columbia River. The bulletin emphasized the need to ensure crews are well rested before fueling operations are undertaken.
- Removed three oil-handling facilities from the regulated list since they had stopped using marine barge oil transfers. Staff worked with the owners and operators of those three facilities to make sure they were properly closed to minimize the potential for any future environment impact.
- Completed 14 full-scale investigations of vessel incidents.
- Received resource damage assessment payments of more than $89,315 in compensation for oil spills.
- Updated the response strategies for most of the marine GRPs, and posted them to the Spills Program Web page. The Columbia and Snake River GRP updates are in progress, and should be completed by the end of 2002.

❑ For more information on the Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Program, visit the Spills Program Web site at:
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/spills.html

❑ To view publications mentioned in this report online, or to order printed copies, visit the Spills Program Publications page on the Department of Ecology Web site at:
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/biblio/spills.html

OREGON:

SPILL AND SITE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (DEQ)

❑ Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) Director and Task Force Member Stephanie Hallock has appointed Land Quality Division Administrator Paul Slyman to serve as the Task Force Member for Oregon. Unfortunately for DEQ and the Task Force, Paul was recalled for active duty to the United States Coast Guard. Until Paul's return, Dave Rozell will be the Acting Land Quality Division Administrator and assuming all of Paul's duties.

❑ The Emergency Response Program at DEQ has been working closely with an Advisory Group to provide input as rules related to Oil Spill Contingency Planning, Emergency Response, Enforcement and Ballast Water are revised. House Bill 2150 (HB 2150) was passed by the Oregon legislature during the 2001 session and amended laws related to oil spill planning fees that provide funding for the oil spill prevention program, clarified the role of the state on-scene coordinator, consolidated financial responsibility requirements, requires oil spill contingency plans for inland pipelines and directed DEQ to create a work group to examine the benefits of preparedness planning and response strategies for inland facilities. This bill was crafted in coordination with the maritime and petroleum community. Senate Bill 895 required DEQ to adopt rules related to ballast water management.

❑ The Department is developing a draft dispersant use approval policy. It is anticipated that the policy will be ready for public review sometime in early 2003.

- **Situation.** "Wreck removal activities remain suspended. Continued deterioration of the wreck has been noted throughout the period with losses of plating and structure evinced by periodic findings of rusty metal fragments on the beach in way of the wreck and observed loss of deck plating and enlarging penetrations of the engine room bulkhead. The gross location and orientation of the wreck of the stern section remains essentially the same as during the period of the last IAP. A detailed survey conducted on 14 December 2001 revealed that the orientation and location had changed slightly since 4 April 2000 with a reported minor clockwise rotation in the horizontal plane, some southeasterly displacement, a settling into the sand as far as 6 feet at one point and an increase in starboard list from 37° to 44°." (Incident Action Plan, March 1,

2002) Representatives of the ship owner continue to monitor the beach near the stern twice a week. Small numbers of tarballs are occasionally observed.

- **Natural Resource Damage Assessment:** The "Notice of Intent" to enter into the restoration planning phase of a Natural Resource Damage Assessment was published in the Federal Register on November 7, 2001 (66FR56339).

❑ DEQ received 1,938 spill notifications from the Oregon Emergency Management Division in 2001 that generated 938 active spill cases.

- Two hundred forty five (245) of these spills were petroleum products greater than 42 gallons;
- Twenty Seven (27) of the petroleum spills were over 1000 gallons;
- There were 136 spills to navigable waters of the state, 79 involved petroleum products; 46 were over a barrel (42 gallons);
- There were five spills of over 1000 gallons to land;
- Thirty (30) oil spills were from regulated facilities or covered vessels; and
- Eighteen (18) spills were from fishing vessels or other harbor craft.

❑ For more information on the emergency response programs at DEQ, go to http://www.deq.state.or.us/wmc/cleanup/cugrpmain.htm

BRITISH COLUMBIA:

THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, LANDS AND PARKS

❑ The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection (WLAP) works to protect people, property, and the environment from environmental hazards through its emergency program. This program undertakes emergency planning and coordination and uses trained Response Officers for oil and hazardous material response. The Regional Operations Branch in Victoria undertakes environmental emergency planning.

❑ On average, more than 3500 environmental emergencies are reported to the ministry annually; most are hazardous material spills and releases. Response Officers located in regional offices are available to respond to these spills. There is a Manager, Environmental Emergency Planner and an Emergency Operations Officer in Headquarters (Victoria) for planning and preparedness of large-scale incidents from marine, freshwater, and land based hazards.

❑ There are various interagency coordinating committees established to promote cooperation among oil spill response agencies. Memberships include WLAP, the Environment Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Burrard Clean Operations, Transport Canada and the Port of Vancouver. The committees meet regularly to exchange information and to discuss training, equipment, and response issues of mutual concern.

❑ BC Water, Land and Air Protection supports and monitors Coast Guard (both US and Canadian), shipping and oil industry initiatives towards marine oil spill prevention, preparedness and response. Issues include:

- improving Rescue tug capability along BC's West Coast;
- assessing shipping risk on the outer BC coast from vessels on the great-circle route, en route to Alaska, or operating in Canada's territorial sea;
- phasing out of single-hulled oil tankers on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS);
- promoting a unified command approach in marine oil spill response among lead jurisdictions and the Responsible Party;
- reducing chronic spills from commercial and recreational vessels, and
- promoting compliance on waste discharges from passenger and other major vessels.

❑ The Province continues to maintain the Coastal Inventory and Oil Spill Response Information System for coastal protection and planning (http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/osris/osris.html). This computer-based system utilizes satellite imagery with video and geographically linked/mapped coastal inventory data for determining shoreline sensitivity. Coastal resource and land use data have been gathered for the Strait of Georgia, Vancouver Island and Central Coast. An atlas of the west coast of Vancouver is available on CD-ROM.

❑ The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, as the lead provincial agency for spills, is currently training and equipping four Incident Management Teams to deliver on its three response plans for major environmental emergencies (BC Marine Oil Spill Response Plan, BC Inland Oil Spill Response Plan, and BC Hazardous Material Response Plan). These plans and supporting operational guidelines can be found on the Emergency Program's homepage.

❑ The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection is an "associate member" of Burrard Clean Operations for the purpose of improved response capability and to facilitate closer industry and government cooperation.

❑ The Environmental Emergency Program's Homepage is:
http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/eephome/index.htm



❑ In addition, the following reports and documents are available from the British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, PO Box 9377, Stn Prov Govt, Victoria, BC, V8W 9M6, CANADA

- BC Coastal Marine Facility and Operating Standards Manual (11/91)
- Guidelines for Industry Emergency Response Plans (3/92)
- Coastal Resources Oil Spill Response Atlas: Southwest Coast of Vancouver Island (8/90)
- Coastal Resources Oil Spill Response Atlas: Southern Strait of Georgia (11/93)
- Oiled Marine Shoreline Cleanup Training Course (5/95)
- Basic Marine Oil Spill Safety Training Course (5/95)
- The Double Hull Issue and Oil spill Risk on the Pacific West Coast (7/95) (on internet site)
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Expediting the Schedule for Double-Hulling Oil Tankers and Barges Operating in and near British Columbia Waters (9/95)
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Establishing a Dedicated Rescue/Salvage Tug to Serve Canada's Southern West Coast (9/95)
- Financial Preparedness for a Major Marine Oil Spill in British Columbia (9/95)
- BC Marine Oil Spill Response Plan (on internet site)
- BC Inland Oil Spill Response Plan (on internet site)
- BC Hazardous Material Response Plan (on internet site)
- Operational Guidelines for Site-level Emergency Response (on internet site)

CALIFORNIA:

THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME'S OFFICE OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE (OSPR)

❑ OSPR, which is housed within the Department of Fish and Game, is the lead State agency charged with oil spill prevention and response in the marine environment. The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990 established OSPR and provides the OSPR Administrator with substantial authority to direct spill response, cleanup, and natural resource damage assessment activities.



❑ Legislation- AB715 (Wayne) Oil Spill Prevention and Response became law on January 1, 2002. The major components of AB715 are as follows:

- Clarifies the Administrator's authority to rate Oil Spill Response Operations (OSROs).
- Requires rated OSROs to participate in announced and unannounced drills.
- Requires marine facilities, tank vessel operators, and nontank vessel operators to contract with State rated OSROs for oil spill response.
- Requires rated OSROs to meet the six hour response requirements for containment, recovery and storage using only dedicated or OSRO owned resources.
- Authorizes each Harbor Safety Committee to petition the Administrator for appointment of up to five "at-large" members.
- Adds the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) to the State Interagency Oil Spill Committee (SIOSC) and to the SIOSC Regulations Review Subcommittee.

❑ Unannounced Drills - OSPR has continued its comprehensive program to evaluate oil spill response readiness. From March 2001 to April 2002, OSPR conducted 47 unannounced drills on plan holders. The objectives of the drills were to demonstrate the ability of plan holders to make timely notifications to all appropriate parties, and to ensure the deployment of resources, in accordance with approved plans, during the three hours immediately following a simulated oil spill. All seven tank vessels that were tested passed the drills. Nine of the twelve marine facilities tested passed while one of two tank barges passed along with 22 of 26 non-tank vessels.

❑ Unannounced plan holder drills lessons learned:

- Tank ships successfully passed all drills.
- Non-tank vessel crews are not familiar with their contingency plans.
- Some plan holder personnel are not familiar with their own equipment.
- OSROs performed well in meeting the two hour deployment requirement.

❑ Further testing required:

- Conduct more non-tank notification drills.
- Exercise more marine facility immediate containment boom.
- Put more of an emphasis on exercising facilities and vessels outside of the high velocity ports.

❑ Forty-three spills reported in California in 2001 were above the Task Force reporting thresholds of 500 gallons to land and one barrel (42 gallons) to water. 35% of these were from facilities, 41% from vessels, and 12% each from vehicles and pipelines. Diesel was the most common oil spilled (47% by number of cases); gasoline and crude oil each represented 18.5% of the incidents. Human error was the cause in a slim majority of cases (51%), and equipment failure was the cause of 44% of the spills, with 5% unknown.

❑ San Mateo Mystery Spill Solved: On February 8, 2002 the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Francisco Bay and the OSPR announced that they identified the source of oil that incapacitated or killed over 1,541 sea birds off the northern California coast since November 24. The source was identified as the SS Jacob Luckenbach, a 468-foot freight ship that sank in 175 feet of water approximately 17 miles southwest of the Golden Gate Bridge on July 14, 1953 as the result of a collision. In a statement released February 8, Governor Gray Davis said, "I would like to thank the Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response and the U.S. Coast Guard for their tireless efforts in spearheading the search for the source of the oil spill that has depleted California's offshore bird populations over the last ten years. The comprehensive, team approach with the State Lands commission, the National Atmospheric and Oceanographic Administration, U.S. Navy Salvage personnel, and the National Marine Sanctuaries, along with the response industry, brought together experts in oiled wildlife treatment and rehabilitation, satellite imagery, vessel operations, ocean currents, resource economics, wildlife behavior, and oil fingerprint analysis." The U.S. Coast Guard contracted with Titan Maritime LLC to conduct an assessment and develop plans to remove the oil from the Jacob Luckenbach. Additionally, OSPR is developing a risk matrix to determine which of the 1,600 vessels sunk off the California coast pose a threat to the State's valuable coast and coastal resources.

❑ On April 2, 2002, OSPR's Marine Safety Branch (MSB) received an email, accompanied by photographs, explaining that the Chief Engineer of the motor vessel CYGNUS was surreptitiously discharging oily bilge water every time the vessel left port. This would be a violation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships adopted by the International Conference on Marine Pollution, also known as MARPOL. The CYGNUS, a Panamanian flagged car carrier, was scheduled to visit Portland, Oregon on April 9, 2002 and then transit to Los Angeles – Long Beach Harbor. It had no previous pollution violations in the United States. The Marine Safety Branch of OSPR contacted the US Coast Guard (USCG) Pacific Area's Chief of Marine Safety who arranged



for a Coast Guard boarding of the vessel in Portland, Oregon. OSPR also contacted the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality who subsequently notified the Washington Department of Ecology, since the Columbia River is "shared territory." With the information supplied by OSPR, a joint inspection team from Ecology, the Coast Guard and the EPA boarded CYGNUS on April 10, 2002 with a federal search warrant and found a "smoking gun" for a MARPOL case. Several crewmembers were arrested, including the Chief Engineer. This case represents an excellent example of what the states and federal agencies can accomplish by working cooperatively.

❑ For additional information or reports and documents, please visit the OSPR web site at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/Ospr/